Chapter Text
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Tuesday, December 12, 1984
Soviet Nuclear Submarine Lost in North Atlantic; Moscow Silent
U.S. Officials Say Vessel Carried Multiple Warheads; Kremlin Denies Any Incident
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 — A Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine reportedly sank in the North Atlantic Ocean, according to senior American defense officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The vessel, identified by Pentagon analysts as a Typhoon-class submarine designated K-219 and known within Soviet naval circles by the name Krasnyy Oktyabr'— Russian for Red October — was last tracked by American SOSUS hydrophone arrays on Friday evening approximately 1,100 miles northeast of Newfoundland.
"We are monitoring the situation very carefully," said a Defense Department spokesman, who declined to elaborate. "We have assets in the region."
American and British naval vessels were reported to have converged on a stretch of ocean south of Iceland by Sunday morning, and were able to rescue the crew before the Krasnyy Oktyabr' went down. They were not able to recover the officers, including Captain Ilya Rozanov; they were on board the submarine when it sank.
The Soviet Embassy in Washington did not respond to repeated requests for comment.
A Pattern of Silence
The Kremlin's reticence fits a well-documented pattern. Soviet authorities did not publicly acknowledge the loss of the submarine K-129 for years after it sank in the Pacific in 1968, and details of that incident emerged only after a secret CIA salvage operation — later codenamed Project Azorian — recovered a portion of the hull in 1974.
"They don't tell their own people. They certainly don't tell us," said Shane Hollander, a Navy intelligence officer familiar with Soviet submarine operations, speaking from his home in Annapolis.
What May Have Gone Wrong
Former submarine commanders and naval analysts offered several theories about what might have befallen the vessel. A catastrophic reactor coolant failure, a fire in the missile compartment — long considered among the most feared events in submarine operations — or a collision with an American attack submarine that may have been trailing the Krasnyy Oktyabr' were all considered possible.
"These boats are technological marvels and coffins at the same time," said Rear Admiral (Ret.) George Pickett, who commanded Atlantic submarine operations in the late 1970s. "The Soviets have pushed their Typhoon-class boats very hard. The margins for error at that depth, at those speeds, are almost nonexistent."
Congressional Reaction
On Capitol Hill, the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, called for an emergency closed briefing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The American people deserve to know whether we are facing a nuclear incident in international waters," Mr. Proxmire said in a statement released by his office.
The White House issued no statement. A spokeswoman said only that President Reagan had been "fully briefed" and that the situation was "being monitored at the highest levels."
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / CODEWORD
HANDLING: EYES ONLY — DCI, SECDEF, NSC PRINCIPALS
DISSEMINATION: RESTRICTED — NO FOREIGN NATIONALS
DOCUMENT CONTROL: 1 OF 4 COPIES
CABLE REF: DO-AT-84-11-0047
ORIGIN: CLANDESTINE SERVICE / EUROPEAN DIVISION
DATE: 12 DECEMBER 1984
RE: DEFECTION — PERSONNEL OF SOVIET VESSEL K-219 (KRASNYY OKTYABR’)
SUBJECT: CONFIRMED DEFECTION OF SENIOR COMMAND STAFF, K-219
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On the night of 12–13 December 1984, four senior officers of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine K-219, designation Krasnyy Oktyabr', arrived on United States soil. Their defection is assessed as voluntary, premeditated, and of EXCEPTIONAL intelligence value. This event is to be treated as a TIER ONE defection. Unauthorized disclosure will be prosecuted under Executive Order 12333.
SECTION I — DEFECTING PERSONNEL
1. Captain First Rank ILYA ROZANOV, 30 years old. Commanding Officer, K-219. Ten years service, Soviet Northern Fleet. Graduate, Frunze Naval Academy, 1972. Rozanov is assessed as the primary architect of the defection. Motivation assessed as ideological disillusionment regarding the Soviet criminalization of homosexuality, compounded by a romantic relationship with [REDACTED].
2. Captain Second Rank KLIMENT MARLEAU, age 35. Executive Officer. Described by Rozanov as "the only man aboard I trusted completely." Marleau holds detailed knowledge of current Soviet SSBN operational patrol patterns, communication protocols, and emergency authentication procedures. His technical knowledge alone is assessed as worth the full cost of this operation.
3. Captain Lieutenant GENNADY MOROZOV, age 37. Navigation Officer. Possesses complete charts and course logs for K-219's last three deployments, which he removed from the vessel prior to abandonment. These materials are currently in transit to NSA Fort Meade under separate courier cover.
4. Engineer Lieutenant BORIS KASPAROV, age 31. Reactor Systems Officer. Kasparov engineered the false reactor scare that resulted in the evacuation of the crew of K-219.
SECTION II — CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEFECTION
Following the false reactor casualty on 9 December, Rozanov ordered the controlled evacuation of non-essential crew. He, Marleau, and the two officers identified above deliberately remained aboard. Shortly thereafter, they were joined by American Naval Officers from the USS DALLAS, along with [REDACTED], an analyst for the CIA. The Dallas was operating under SPECOP orders, at coordinates WITHHELD — SEE ANNEX C.
SECTION III — DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDED ACTION
It is the recommendation of the Clandestine Service that the following disposition plan, designated OPERATION PALE BIRCH, be approved by the DCI no later than 20 December 1984:
Phase One (Immediate, 0–30 days): Full tactical debriefing at Fort Meade. NSA, DIA, and Naval Intelligence to provide specialist debriefers. Subjects to be held under voluntary but strict communications blackout. No contact with family members at this stage.
Phase Two (30–90 days): Relocation of all four subjects to Continental United States under new identities. The Office of Security has prepared four complete legend packages. Rozanov will be resettled in Annapolis, MD under the name [REDACTED]. Specific resettlement locations for remaining officers are detailed in Annex D (separate distribution).
Phase Three (Ongoing): Subjects will receive standard defector stipends commensurate with intelligence value. Rozanov and Marleau are assessed as candidates for long-term advisory roles with Naval Intelligence. Kasparov and Morozov may be offered a consultancy arrangement with a defense contractor operating under Agency oversight.
SECTION IV — COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS
The possibility of a provocation operation cannot be entirely discounted at this time. However, based on the volume and specificity of intelligence already provided during initial screening, and the corroboration of multiple details against existing SIGINT holdings, the Clandestine Service assesses with HIGH CONFIDENCE that this defection is genuine.
All personnel with knowledge of PALE BIRCH are reminded that unauthorized disclosure of the survival of K-219's command staff would constitute a grave risk to the subjects' lives and to the integrity of ongoing collection operations against the Soviet Northern Fleet.
PREPARED BY: [REDACTED], GS-15 EUROPEAN DIVISION, CLANDESTINE SERVICE REVIEWED BY: [REDACTED] DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS DESTRUCTION NOTICE: THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE RETAINED. DESTROY BY APPROVED NSA METHOD AFTER READING. NO REPRODUCTION AUTHORIZED. TOP SECRET / CODEWORD / EYES ONLY CABLE REF: DO-AT-84-11-0047